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Abstract 
 
Innovations can often be targeted to be more valuable for some consumers than others.  
This is especially true for digital information goods.  We show that the traditional price 
system not only results in significant deadweight loss, but also provides incorrect 
incentives to the creators of these innovations.  In contrast, we propose and analyze a 
profit-maximizing mechanism for bundles of digital goods which is more efficient and 
more accurately provides innovation incentives for information goods. Our “statistical 
couponing mechanism” does not rely on the universal excludability of information goods, 
which creates substantial deadweight loss, but instead estimates social value created from 
new goods and innovations by offering coupons to a relatively small sample of 
representative consumers. We find that the statistical couponing mechanism can operate 
with less than 0.1% of the deadweight loss of the traditional price-based system, while 
more accurately aligning incentives with social value. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Innovation is an important driver of firm productivity and social welfare for goods in 
general, and for digital information goods in particular.  The ultimate outcome of these 
innovations, whether for music, software or other information goods is improved 
consumer value.  For the society, as long as the expected cost of introducing an 
innovation is smaller than the expected benefit (social welfare), the innovation should be 
encouraged. 
However, firms may not always want to innovate in these circumstances.  In general, 
they innovate only if the expected profit is higher than the expected cost.  Furthermore, 
they may undertake some innovations which are profitable but do not increase net social 
welfare.  Firms’ profit objectives are usually not completely aligned with the society’s 
social welfare objectives, and when this happens, there is deadweight loss. 
In the traditional price system, the objective of firm profit is aligned with the objective of 
social welfare only when the price of a good is set at the marginal cost of producing the 
good.  This is usually unattainable in the real world, and we show below that even when 
social efficiency is ensured (firms setting price equal to the marginal cost), innovation 
incentives are still not correctly provided to the firms from a social planner’s point of 
view.  For digital information goods, where marginal cost of copies approaches zero, the 
price system is particularly problematic.  Not surprisingly, business models for digital 
information are often chaotic, confusing and unstable. 
In this paper, we establish a simple framework to study how an innovation can change the 
consumer’s valuations, and we identify two types of innovations: uniform enhancement 
and targeted innovation.  We show that the traditional price system cannot generally 
provide correct innovation incentives for firms to innovate, and a better price system 
should be rewarding creators based on their social contributions.  Our proposed 
mechanism addresses this issue for digital goods with the help of the unique property of 
digital goods, namely, the near zero marginal cost of these goods.  Interestingly, it is this 
very property that creates serious pricing issues for the various digital goods industries.  
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For example, digitized music has been blamed for the decline in music CD sales since 
2001. The availability of digital music is said to threaten the incentives for innovation 
and creativity itself in this industry. It has engendered a ferocious backlash, with 
thousands of lawsuits, fierce lobbying in Congress, major public relations campaigns, 
sophisticated digital rights management systems (DRMs), and lively debate all around. 
Music is not the only industry affected. Software, news, stock quotes, magazine 
publishing, gaming, classified ads, phone directories, movies, telephony, postal services, 
radio broadcasting, photography are just a few of the other industries also in the midst of 
transformation. Two predictions can be made with near certainty about the next decade: 
the costs of storing, processing and transmitting digital information will drop by at least 
another 10-fold and the vast majority of commercial information will be digitized. 
The debate reflects two opposing economic ideas.  On one hand, the near-zero marginal 
costs of reproducing digital goods suggestions that static welfare, the sum of consumer 
and producer surplus, would be maximized by making these goods available at zero price.  
In that way, all consumers with a value greater than the marginal cost, i.e. zero, would 
have access to them, and deadweight loss would be minimized.  On the other hand, a 
zero price would provide no revenues to the creators of the goods, and thus no incentives 
for their creation in the first place, leading to potentially even larger losses of social 
welfare over time. 
Thus, the debate centers on who will be impaled on the two horns of the dilemma: should 
creators be deprived of the rewards from their creations or should users be deprived of 
goods which cost nothing to produce?  Either approach is demonstrably suboptimal (e.g. 
Lessig, 2004). It would seem impossible to have both efficiency and innovation when it 
comes to digital goods. Improving one goal appears to be inextricably intertwined with 
hurting the other goal. 
1.2 Preview of the Paper 
In this paper, we explore the possibility of a third way. In particular, we develop and 
analyze a method for providing improved incentives for innovation to the creators of 
digital goods. We show that it is possible to decouple the payments to the innovators 
from the charges to consumers while still maintaining budget balance. In this way, we 
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can deliver strong incentives yet unhindered access to the goods for almost all interested 
consumers. In fact, we find that our system actually provides better incentives for 
innovation than the traditional price system, even if the traditions system is bolstered by 
powerful DRMs and new laws to enhance excludability and thus monopoly power.  
We argue that in some cases it may be misguided to try to force the old paradigm of 
excludability onto digital goods without modification. Ironically, DRMs and new laws 
are often used to strip digital goods of one of their most appealing and 
economically-beneficial attributes – the ease of widespread use. At the same time, we 
take seriously the need to reward innovators financially if we wish to continue to 
encourage innovation and creativity. 
The essence of our mechanism is to a) aggregate a large number of relevant digital goods 
together and sell them as a bundle and then b) allocate the revenues from this aggregation 
to each of the contributors to the bundle in proportion to the value they contribute, using 
statistical sampling and targeted coupons. We do this in a way which is fully 
budget-balancing (meaning: no outside subsidy needed for the system to work) efficiency 
losses as small as 0.1% of the traditional price system.  Furthermore, our mechanism 
provides substantially better incentives for content creation than a “perfect” 
implementation of the traditional price based system where goods are sold individually 
and creators keep 100% of the revenues. 
Large digital collections are increasingly common as much Internet content moves from 
free to fee-based systems and as new forms of digital content, such as satellite radio, 
emerge. Consider the bundles that constitute XM radio, Cable TV, AOL content, 
Rhapsody music, Consumer Reports reviews, JSTOR academic articles and Microsoft 
Office software.  
Bundling has been analyzed in some depth in the academic literature, including a cluster 
of articles specifically focusing on the bundling of digital information goods (e.g. Bakos 
& Brynjolfsson, 1999, 2000 and the references therein). A key finding from the literature 
is that in equilibrium, very large bundles of information goods can provide content that is 
accessible to the vast majority of the consumers in the relevant market. It will not be 
profitable to exclude (via pricing) any consumers except the small fraction who have 
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improbably low valuations for an improbably large number of the goods in the bundle. 
Thus, bundling can dramatically increase economic efficiency in the allocation of 
information goods to consumers. 
Given the prior literature on bundling information goods, our paper focuses on the second 
part of the mechanism, which involves designing a system for allocating revenues from 
such a bundle. This is necessary because by its very nature, bundling destroys the critical 
knowledge about how much each of the goods in the bundle is valued by consumers. Did 
the consumer subscribe to XM radio for the classical music or for some other piece of 
content that was in the bundle?  How much did the consumer value each of these 
components?  Unlike for unbundled goods, the consumer’s purchase behavior for the 
bundle does not automatically reveal the answers to these questions.  This creates a 
problem when it comes time to reward the creators and providers of the component goods. 
Surveys, usage data and managerial “instinct” can all help allocate revenue to reward 
content creators, but none is likely to be as accurate as a true price-based system.  
Our mechanism re-introduces prices, but only for a tiny fraction of consumers. For 
instance, in a large-scale implementation, only 1000 consumers out of several million 
would face any prices for individual goods, typically via special coupons. Because of the 
law of large numbers, this allows us to get fairly accurate, unbiased assessments of value 
of the good as long as these consumers are chosen randomly, or better yet, 
representatively.  However, because the vast majority of consumers do not face any 
non-zero price for individual goods, they incur virtually no inefficiency. Specifically, 
99.9% of users have access to any given good as long as their value for that good is 
greater than zero and their values for all other goods in the bundle are not simultaneously 
unusually low.1  
In particular, our paper introduces a “statistical couponing mechanism” and argues that it 
is technically feasible and that it can dominate any of the approaches debated thus far.  
Barriers to diffusion and assimilation of this approach are likely to include overcoming 
knowledge barriers and some measure of organizational and institutional learning. Our 
analysis is meant to be a first step in addressing these obstacles. Notably, if this 
                                                
1 The efficiency properties of large bundles of information goods is analyzed in in Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999). 
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innovation succeeds, it should actually increase the pace of future innovations by 
improving incentives for the creation of useful digital goods. At a minimum, a broader 
discussion of this type of approach should change the terms of the existing debate about 
business models for digital goods. 
In the remainder of this section, we review the related literature.  Section 2 analyzes the 
incentives for innovation under the standard price system and shows how they are 
incorrect. Section 3 discusses some possible ways to address this issue using IT, as well 
as the weaknesses of each of these alternatives.  Section 4 introduces our statistical 
couponing mechanism in detail and provides simulations which demonstrate its high 
efficiency when the number of consumers is reasonably large.  Section 5 provides some 
remarks on the feasibility of our mechanism and Section 6 concludes with a brief 
summary. 
1.3 Related Literature 
The academic literature related to our analysis is somewhat sparse. Some of the closest 
research is the work on a monopolist facing an unknown demand curve (e.g. Aghion et al, 
1991) where it is shown that the seller can experiment by pricing to different buyers 
sequentially and updating the price accordingly.  In addition, as discussed later in our 
paper, Spence (1976) discusses some related problems with incentives for investments in 
improving quality. 
We are not aware of any systems which fully implement both part of our mechanism, 
although bits and pieces are used in various industries and applications. For instance, as 
noted above, there are many examples of bundling for digital goods. Revenue allocation 
similar to our approach is more difficult to find. The American Society of Composers, 
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) does seek to monitor the consumption of its members’ 
works and distribute its revenues to each creator in rough proportion to this consumption. 
However, they generally do not use direct price data, and thus typically work under the 
implicit assumption that all songs have equal value to each listener. 
In William Fisher’s (2004) book, he explores various solutions to the music piracy 
problem brought about by the new peer-to-peer technology. Specifically, he proposes to 
replace major portions of the copyright and encryption-based models with a 
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“governmentally administered reward system”. He correctly points out that to assess the 
correct level of these rewards, what we really need is not the number of downloads, but 
the “frequency with which each recording is listened to or watched” (i.e. the real value to 
consumers). Fisher’s proposal is similar to the Nielsen TV sampling approach, and he 
proposes to implement special devices to estimate the frequency of each recording is 
listened to. He also suggests that the frequency should be multiplied by the duration of 
the works, and that consumer’s intensity of enjoyment, obtained through a voting system, 
should be taken into consideration to make more precise estimates of the valuations.  
This proposal, if carried out, could be superior to the current practice taken by ASCAP 
(and BMI, SESAC, etc.) to compensate the creators of musical works, and it comes very 
near to the ideal of learning consumers’ valuations and distribute money accordingly; but 
it also suffers from several inherent problems. First, unlike from Nielson TV sampling, 
people may use different devices to enjoy the same digital content. For example, a song 
can be played with an MP3 player in the car, a CD player in the home entertainment 
system, or a DVD drive on a computer. Second, and more critically, as shown in the 
public goods literature, a voting system such as that proposed by Fisher is not reliable 
because individual hidden incentives can induce voters to misrepresent their true values.  
For instance, consumer might falsely claim to have an extremely high or low value for a 
good in an attempt to influence the voting.  In essence, the Fisher approach still does not 
provide a reliable, incentive-compatible way to determine the true value of each good to 
consumers.2  
2 Incorrect Innovation Incentives 
Providing correct innovation incentives can be an issue for information goods. It is 
important to note that innovation incentives are often dramatically incorrect in the 
traditional pricing mechanism. This is exacerbated not only by the very low marginal 
costs of information goods, but also by another property, their enormous malleability and 
flexibility.  Unlike most physical goods made of atoms, goods made of bits can easily be 
                                                
2 The public goods mechanism design literature seeks to provide a remedy to the voter misrepresentation problem. 
Specifically, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism can be shown to induce truth-telling by all participants. 
However, it has two fatal flaws. First, it is not budget-balancing - significant inflows (or net penalties) are generally 
needed. Second, it is quite fragile. Each participant must believe that all other participants are truth-telling or he will 
not tell the truth himself. Accordingly, while VCG design is intriguing in theory, it is rarely, if ever, seen in practice. 
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redesigned and reconfigured.  Accordingly, unlike in traditional manufacturing and 
service industries, the core production workers, at companies the produce information 
goods like software work on changing the design of existing products and introducing 
new ones, not on manufacturing and distributing copies of existing designs, which is 
relatively trivial by comparison.  This means that innovations in information goods can 
be highly targeted to specific consumer segments, if the seller so desires. 
The traditional price system based on excludability does an impressive job in allocating 
resources and encouraging innovation.  However, we argue that the traditional pricing 
mechanism does not ordinarily provide correct innovation incentives to producers of 
information goods. 
Suppose that the seller can invest in trying to create an innovation which improves 
consumers’ valuations of her product. The investment can be in the form of improving 
product quality, functionality or educating users to use the product more effectively. We 
now give a closer look at the innovation incentives of the seller.  
In the next sections, all results are depicted with figures of arbitrary demand curves. 
2.1 Uniform enhancement 
 
Figure 1: A uniform upward shift of demand curve 
 
We begin with the simple case of an innovation that affects all consumers equally. In 
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particular, suppose the innovation can increase each consumer’s valuation by δ. This is 
equivalent to moving the demand curve upward by δ. 
When the demand is shifted upward, the monopolistic seller will be charging a new price 
 that maximizes her profit.  With this innovation, she can expect to gain 
some additional profit indicated by the shaded area in Figure 1.  In the figure, although 
the potential value the seller has created for society is the area between the two demand 
curves, in the traditional price system (with a single price for the good), she gets 
additional revenue and profit indicated by the shaded area. This shaded area is also, 
therefore, the amount of incentive for creating the innovation – the seller will pursue such 
innovations if the expected value is great than the expected cost. The areas representing 
the value of the innovation to society and the value of the innovation to the seller are not 
necessarily equal. Part of the seller’s profit from the innovation comes from transferring 
surplus between the consumer and the seller, which has no net benefit to society. On the 
other hand, part of the profit also comes from reducing the deadweight loss to a certain 
extent, which does improve social welfare.  Thus, depending on the exact shape of the 
demand curve, the incentives for innovation can be inaccurate. 
2.2 Targeted innovation 
Incentives are particularly misaligned for innovations which can be targeted, so they 
affect only a small subset of consumers’ valuations. In particular, the innovation may be 
less significant so that only some consumers with valuation near some  are affected. 
For instance, consider three cases: a software developer could invest in adding features 
which would 
i) make satisfied users of its product even more satisfied, or 
ii) increase the value to consumers whose values were just below the market 
price, turning them into buyers, or  
iii) features which would increase the value of non-buyers, but not enough to turn 
them into buyers.  
Suppose that the developer has a limited budget and can only pursue one of these three 
types of innovations. Even if innovations of type i) or iii) might create more value for 
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society, the traditional price system will only provide incentives for innovation ii).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Social benefit/loss vis-à-vis seller innovation. 
 
In Figure 2, shows this graphically.3 The seller takes some effort to innovate and creates 
some extra social value indicated by the area ABC, we can easily see that in the 
traditional price system, given a fixed level of δ, the possible region of innovation can not 
be far away from the optimal price p*. This narrow range can be indicated by a pair of 
values:  and .  In other words, for all values lower than  or higher than , 
the seller can not extract enough profit to justify the cost of innovation, so only 
innovation ii) will be carried out under the traditional price system.  This is very 
intuitive, in the traditional market, if the seller sells goods to consumers with valuation 
                                                
3 A more formal analysis can be found in our companion paper, Brynjolfsson and Zhang (2005) 
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higher than , it does not help to increase their valuations further because that will only 
contribute to consumer surplus, and the seller will not be able to extract the added value. 
Similarly, for the potential consumers with lower valuations (lower than , to be 
precise), the seller will not take the effort to innovate because these people will not be 
converted to consumers. For small δ, the range ( , ) is very small, and even in this 
range, innovation may not always be socially desirable. 
Thus, in the traditional price mechanism, the seller has too little incentive to create 
innovations that mainly benefit consumers with very low or very high valuations. If your 
valuation is substantially above or below the equilibrium price for a good, don’t expect 
the good’s provider to put significant effort into innovating to specifically address your 
needs.  
Interestingly, even while under-investing in certain types of innovations, the seller also 
has incentive to over-invest in other types of innovations.  To see the socially wasteful 
incentive of innovation in the traditional price system, consider the case of the 
consumers’ valuations near the optimal price. For example, if the seller takes an effort to 
innovate and increases the valuation for some consumers from  to , but not 
for any other consumers, then her optimal effort is proportional to the triangle indicated 
by AJF, but her gains is as large as the entire rectangle indicated by DJF.  When δ is 
small, the ratio of the seller’s incentives to the optimal incentives can become arbitrarily 
large.  In other works, meaning that the seller can have radically excessive incentives to 
innovate for people whose valuations are close to the optimal price . 
This is a striking result, the innovation for people whose valuation is just above the 
optimal price will reduce consumer surplus, yet this is exactly the range where it is most 
profitable for the sellers to innovate.  An innovation in this neighborhood which costs 
many times more than the value it creates would still be profitably pursued. 
2.3  Discussion 
The issue with targeted innovation is but one manifestation of misallocated (or 
narrowly-allocated) resources for creating values for consumers.  If we look at one 
product as a collection of functional features, then the creator will be too focused on 
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innovations around those features that cater to the marginal consumer (and thus ignoring 
possible innovations for consumers with much higher or much lower valuations).  In a 
product bundle, through the traditional price system, the bundler will immediately get a 
positive feedback if she introduces a new product catering to the marginal consumer as 
this will turn some non-buyers to buyers.  However, if she introduces an improvement to 
the bundle that caters to the higher valued consumers, she can not see a corresponding 
profit.  In the long run, this feedback process will discourage the bundler to introduce 
anything far away from catering only to the marginal buyers. 
Spence (1976) studied the inability of prices to convey information about quality 
improvements in products.  He argued that if firms are not perfect price discriminators 
(i.e. if firms are not paid according to the social value they create), then the profits are not 
equal to its net contribution to surplus, and since “profitability is the criterion by which 
products are selected or rejected in a market system,… this may not always lead to 
desirable results.”  Compared with deadweight loss, this type of inefficiency has largely 
been neglected in the literature.  In the next sections, we will be examining the special 
property of digital goods, and we propose a pricing mechanism that avoids exactly this 
kind of inefficiency as well as the traditional deadweight loss inefficiency. 
3 Bundling and Mechanisms for Providing 
Incentives for Digital Innovation 
3.1 Bundling can reduce deadweight loss 
As noted in the introduction, if the marginal cost of producing a good is zero, charging 
any price greater than zero for that good can be socially inefficient: some consumers (e.g. 
those with valuations less than the price but greater than zero) will be excluded from 
consuming the good even though it would be socially beneficial for them to have access 
to it.  The zero marginal cost of reproducing digital goods has created huge pricing 
problems for various industries: it takes work, talent, and luck to create a successful CD, 
but once digitized as an mp3 file, any piece of music can be reproduced with virtually 
zero cost.  The music industry has been profoundly influenced by this property of digital 
goods, and we are very likely to see more industries follow suit.  Technology has 
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enabled us to distribute digital goods more efficiently, but we must find the right 
mechanism to encourage their creation and to allocate them.   Without a good 
mechanism for digital goods, we will not be able to provide sufficient innovation 
incentives for the creation of these digital goods. 
It is shown in Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) that, in certain cases, bundling can be a 
partial solution for pricing of digital goods.  By the law of large numbers, it is easier to 
find an optimal price for a bundle of digital goods than for each individual good.  In 
equilibrium, the profit maximizing price for a large bundle will be set low enough so that 
virtually all consumers interested in any of the goods in the bundle will choose to buy the 
whole bundle (even if they use only a small fraction of its components).  For instance, 
most PC users buy Microsoft Office, even if they don’t use all its applications, or even 
not all of the features of the applications that they do use. While there may be 
anti-competitive implications (see Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 2000), such bundling does 
give the socially desirable result of dramatically reducing the deadweight loss because 
fewer consumers are excluded from using any of the bundled goods in equilibrium. In 
essence, once consumers pay a lump-sum to purchase the bundle, they can consume any 
of the goods in the bundle at zero marginal cost. Thus, when the cost of reproducing the 
goods is close to zero, bundling can provide close-to-optimal allocation of goods to 
consumers (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999).4 
However these benefits come at a major cost. Bundling inherently destroys information 
about how each of the component goods is valued by consumers. Is the bundle selling 
because of the fresh sounds of a new artist or due to the lasting appeal of a traditional 
favorite?  Without this information, it is impossible to allocate revenues to the providers 
of content in a way that accurately encourages value creation. Selling goods individually 
would automatically solve this problem, but as discussed above, individual sales create 
enormous inefficiencies because they exclude some users with positive value from access 
                                                
4 If a single seller can not provide a large enough number of information goods to achieve the benefits of massive 
bundling, it can be worthwhile to have a content aggregator to negotiate with multiple sellers to offer a bundle of 
information goods from multiple sources. 
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to the good. 
Basically, bundling helps to address the innovation incentive problem by offering a 
viable business model to reward the creators of digital goods with much less deadweight 
loss than a la carte pricing.  However, bundling introduces another problem of 
innovation incentives – this mechanism does not give us a natural solution to distribute 
the revenue to provide correct incentives for each of the goods’ creators.  We will 
discuss the revenue distribution problem in the next section.   
To illustrate the problem, we can make a simple comparison between items sold in 
Wal-Mart and songs sold in an online subscription service to digital goods.  Every item 
in Wal-Mart will go through the POS scanner, so Wal-Mart knows if the blue jeans from 
Levi’s sell better than the jeans from Eddie Bauer’s, and this information can be used to 
quickly adjust purchasing and pricing.  If Levi’s produces better jeans, the price system 
will automatically reward the company with more revenues.  This is a very desirable 
situation for all parties: the consumers can have access to products they like, Wal-Mart 
can respond to the market very quickly and ensure a competitive advantage, and most 
importantly, the creators of better products can get automatically rewarded. 
When we observe a consumer subscribing to a bundle of digital goods, however, we do 
not automatically know from his purchase which song, feature, or other component he 
values more, thus the creator of the favorite component can not be properly rewarded.  It 
is interesting to note that any form of bundling creates this problem, no matter the 
components are digital or not.  For example, when we see people buying a subscription 
to cable TV, we do not automatically know which channels they value more than others; 
when people buy the Microsoft office bundle, we do not automatically know whether 
Word or Excel is more valuable. 
3.2 The Revenue Distribution Problem 
The ideal revenue distribution mechanism would be one which somehow determined 
each good’s demand curve, and distributed the revenue among the content providers in 
proportion to the social value of each good to all consumers. This value can be calculated 
by integrating the area below each good’s demand curve. Various mechanisms used to 
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derive demand curve proposed in the literature all fail here because bundle pricing does 
not automatically provide way to observe the market’s response to a price change of 
individual goods.  
If the benefits created by each good cannot be observed or calculated, then a host of 
inefficiencies may result. First, the content providers may not have enough incentives to 
produce creative products in the first place, and consumers will eventually be harmed. 
Second, without a good signal of consumers’ preference, content providers may produce 
content, but not the content that best fit the consumers’ taste. Third, in any effort to 
overcome these problems, the collection of content producers may lead the potential 
bundler to adopt other strategies such as a la carte pricing. However, such strategies 
re-introduce the deadweight loss problem discussed at the beginning of section 1.  
In the following subsections, we discuss the costs and benefits of several ways to 
distribute revenue to address this challenge, culminating with our proposed statistical 
couponing mechanism. 
3.3 Payment determined by number of downloads 
In the context of digital information goods, it is often natural to assume that the seller 
may be able to observe the number of times that each good is accessed. This gives us the 
following approach. 
If one is willing to assume that the number of accesses signals popularity and popularity 
is a measure of value, we can infer the value by the number of accesses. Traditionally, 
this scheme is broadly used in the market of digital goods such as music, movie, TV 
shows, and software. For example, each episode of Friends got about 29 million viewers 
per week in its last year, which was far more than most other TV shows; as a 
consequence, each of the six stars was paid $1.2 million per episode, far more than most 
other TV actors. 
More formally, suppose we have n goods in the bundle, the price for the bundle is B. Also 
suppose there are m buyers of the bundle, each represented by j (j=1,...,m), then the total 
bundle revenue is . We assume the system can record the number of downloads 
of buyer j for good i: , then the provider of content i should be paid: 
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.                          (1) 
This method is extremely easy to implement. In fact, the last equation implies that the 
bundler does not even have to keep record of all the downloads made by the m buyers, 
she can simply record di, the number good i has been downloaded. 
This method is powerful in the context when all the goods are approximately equal in 
value.  However, if goods differ in value (bundling very cheap “Joke-A-Day” with more 
expensive “Forrester Research Report”), then pricing based on number of downloads is 
misleading. (The Joke-A-Day may be downloaded more times than the Forrester 
Research Report, but aggregate value of the latter may be much higher). Another problem 
with this method is that it gives dishonest content providers a way to distort the values by 
manipulating the number of downloads of their own content. This has been a problem, for 
instance, with some advertising-supported content where prices are based on thousands of 
impressions recorded (Hu, 2004). 
3.4 Payment determined by downloads combined with a 
stand-alone price 
Number of downloads itself is not a good measure of consumer valuation in many cases. 
Assuming there also exists a stand-alone price for every information good in the bundle, 
and assuming these prices are all fair prices, we can then derive an improved mechanism 
to distribute the revenue. 
Consider the market introduced in subsection 3.1, suppose each item i (i=1,..,n) in the 
bundle also has a stand-alone price pi.  
Building on the equation from subsection 3.1, an improved way to distribute the revenue 
is through the following formula: 
        (2) 
which says that the revenue to distribute to content provider i should be a proportion of 
the total revenue ( ), and the proportion is determined by the sum of each 
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consumer’s valuation of good j. 
This method has the advantage of being more precise comparing to the previous solution. 
Indeed, if “Joke-A-Day” is sold separately, its price will probably be much lower than 
that of “Forrester Research Report”. The disadvantage of this method is that a fair and 
separate price may not always be readily available. If the distribution of revenue is set 
according to this method, and when bundling becomes a major source of revenue, there is 
room for content providers to mis-represent the stand-alone price. Furthermore, this 
approach implicitly assumes that the value from each good is proportional to the 
stand-alone price. However, this will only be true if the price paid by the marginal 
consumer of each goods is proportional to the average price that would be paid by all 
consumers of that good, for all goods.5 
3.5 Discussion 
As discussed above and in the introduction, merely adding an accounting framework to 
the traditional price system does not guarantee a socially efficient outcome of distributing 
the digital goods and providing correct innovation incentives to the sellers.  In the next 
section, we propose a mechanism that goes beyond the excludability-based traditional 
price system. 
4 Statistical Couponing Mechanism 
4.1 Description of the Mechanism 
As discussed in the last section, the ideal way to provide correct incentives is to learn 
consumers’ valuations for each good and make corresponding payments. Since bundling 
itself obscures consumers’ valuations for individual goods, here we propose a mechanism 
to reveal the demand curve for each good by issuing targeted coupons to a small sample 
of consumers. For large populations, it is possible for the targeted sample to be large 
enough to be representative statistically while still being small enough to be fairly 
unimportant economically. Our mechanism is substantially different from the traditional 
use of coupons as a marketing method to price discriminate consumers. Instead, coupons 
                                                
5 Barro and Romer (1987) explore how similar proportionalities can explain a number of pricing anomolies.  
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in our mechanism are similar to the price experiments suggested in the optimal pricing 
literature. 
Suppose the monopolistic bundler offers a bundle of information goods to a group of 
consumers. In order to derive the demand curve for one of the components, we choose 
m⋅n representative consumers and issue each of them a single coupon, where n is the 
number of price levels covering the range of the valuations, which we call “coupon 
levels”, and m is the number of coupons to be offered for each of the price levels in total, 
which we call “sample points”. While  should be large enough to make statistically 
valid inferences, it can nonetheless be a very small fraction (e.g. 1/1000 or less) of the 
total set of consumers buying the bundle. 
If a consumer receives a coupon with face value , then he can either choose to ignore 
the coupon and enjoy the complete bundle or choose to redeem the coupon and forfeit the 
right to use a particular component of the bundle, which is indicated on the coupon. So 
upon observing a consumer’s action, the bundler can learn whether that consumer’s 
valuation for that component is higher or lower than the face value of that particular 
coupon. Aggregating the m consumers’ valuations will give the bundler a good estimate 
of the valuations at that price, summarizing the results for the n coupon levels, the 
bundler can plot a fairly accurate demand curve.6  The area under the resulting demand 
curve, when scaled up to the whole population, is the total social valuation for that 
particular good, and also the maximum revenue which that good can contribute to the 
bundle revenue. Using the same method for all the components, the bundler can learn the 
approximate social valuation and revenue potential of each of the goods in the bundle. 
She can then distribute the revenue among the content providers according to their 
contribution share to the total valuation. Let R be the total revenue from selling bundles, 
and  be the social value of the component i in the bundle, content provider of i should 
be paid 
                                                
6 An alternative approach to revealing consumer demand would be to reverse the default consumption rights of the 
consumers which were targeted.   The targeted consumer would be required to pay the specified offer price in order to 
obtain access to the selected good.  Consumers who did not pay the relevant price would not have access to that good. 
As with the coupons, only consumers with a value greater than the relevant offer prices would choose to consume the 
good,thereby revealing the demand curve. 
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,                               (3) 
where N is the total number of content providers. 
4.2 Comparison with other methods for providing innovation 
incentives 
This method compares favorable to the traditional price mechanism.  The traditional 
price mechanism subjects 100% of consumers to the inefficiency of positive prices.  
However, only data from a small fraction of consumers are needed to get fairly accurate 
estimates of the value created and contributed by each good.  The greater precision 
obtained by increasing the sample declines asymptotically to zero while the cost for 
subjecting each additional consumer to a positive price remains just as high for the last 
consumer sampled as the first one.  When balancing the costs and benefits, the optimal 
sample size is almost surely less than 100%.  Secondly, the proposed couponing 
mechanism actually provides a more accurate estimate of the overall demand curve than 
any single-price traditional system.  Because multiple different prices for coupons are 
offered, a much more accurate overall picture of demand can be obtained than simply 
revealing the demand at a single price, as conventional prices do.  As discussed in 
Section 1, this has large and important implications for dynamic efficiency and 
innovation incentives. 
One can also compare our couponing mechanism with the well-known 
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Unlike VCG, our mechanism does not give 
us exact valuations for each consumer. However, in general, approximate demand 
functions of the components will suffice, and by increasing the sample size, the accuracy 
can be made almost arbitrarily precise. Our mechanism is superior to the VCG 
mechanism in several ways. (1) Truth-telling is a robust and strong equilibrium in the 
couponing mechanism, in the sense that each consumer simply compares his valuation 
with the coupon’s face value, he is not required to assign correct beliefs on all other 
people’s votes.  (2) In the VCG, if one respondent misreports his value (due to 
irrationality or due to error), the consequence may be very severe for the rest of the 
people.  Furthermore, coalitions of consumers can “game” the VCG to their advantage.  
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However, in the couponing mechanism, the effects on others from a consumer’s 
misreport are minimal.  (3) The couponing mechanism is fully budget balancing, unlike 
the VCG. (4) The couponing mechanism is more intuitive than the VCG for real world 
problems. 
4.3 Simulation results for the mechanism 
It can be shown that for any one of the components in the bundle, given a large number 
of randomly chosen respondents and level of coupons, the above mechanism gives an 
empirical demand function that arbitrarily approximates the true demand function (See 
Brynjolfsson and Zhang, 2005).  
We can also run simulations to see the effectiveness of this mechanism (see Figure 3). 
  
Figure 3: Simulation Results for the Couponing Mechanism  
 
The use of our coupon mechanism gives us empirical estimates of the inverse demand 
curves for each of the distributions, and we define the error rates to be the percentage 
differences between the area under the empirical demand curve and the area under the 
true demand curve. Figure 3 shows the result of the coupon mechanism applied to the 
uniform distribution, other distributions yield similar figures. We see that error rate is 
declining with more coupon levels and with more sample points for each coupon value. 
With just 20 coupon levels, the error rate is as low as 5%. Adding more sample points for 
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each coupon value also helps to improve the precision. For example, with 40 coupon 
levels, sampling 20 consumers for each coupon level (for a total of 800 respondents) 
gives us an error rate of 10%, and sampling 80 consumers improves the error rate to be 
near 5%. From the error rate curves, we can also see that when sampling 20 consumers, 
adding coupon levels beyond 10 does not improve the precision significantly; also, when 
sampling 80 consumers, adding coupon levels beyond 15 does not improve the precision 
significantly. This observation tells us that we have to add coupon levels and sampling 
points simultaneously in order to achieve the best result estimating the social values of 
goods. Error rate converges toward 0 more quickly for fatter demand curves (the ones 
with a higher expected value). In our simulations, for some demand curves, with just 5 
coupon levels and 20 sample points (for mere 100 respondents), the mechanism can give 
us an error rate below 0.1%. Thus, sampling just 100 consumers can provide almost as 
accurate an estimate of demand as sampling the entire population of consumers of the 
good, which could be in the millions.  
The deadweight loss is proportionately smaller, too. Consumers who cash-in the coupons 
forgo access to the corresponding good, which creates a deadweight loss (unless the 
consumer’s value was exactly zero). For such a consumer, this decision is analogous to 
facing a market price, with similar costs, benefits and overall incentives. However, in 
contrast to the traditional price approach, our mechanism only subjects a fraction of 
consumers to this decision, so only a fraction choose not to buy, and the total deadweight 
loss is only a fraction of what it used to be. 
This mechanism can be used to solve the revenue distribution problem discussed in 
section 3, and we can show that this mechanism can also help to avoid the innovation 
incentive issues arising in traditional price systems: 
(a) If an innovation can increase only some consumers’ valuations, the traditional price 
system does not provide correct incentives for the producer to innovate for people 
with relatively high or relatively low valuations. In contrast, the proposed mechanism 
always gives the producer socially desirable level of incentives to innovate, and 
(b) As shown in the analysis in section 2, the traditional price system gives the producer 
too high an incentive to innovate where it is most harmful to the social welfare, and 
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no incentive elsewhere; the proposed mechanism induces the producer to make 
socially desirable innovation efforts. 
5 Remarks on Feasibility 
This paper contributes to establishing a more efficient approach to create, distribute and 
consume digital goods.  The theoretical foundation proposed here is just the first step 
toward this goal; in order to build viable business models, we need to address some 
practical issues to be discussed below. 
In this paper, couponing has been analyzed solely as a mechanism for revealing existing 
demand, not for influencing it.  Of course, in practice, couponing may also be viewed as 
a form of advertising that increases demand.  If it increases demand more for some 
goods, and not for others, then the estimated values may be biased in a non-uniform 
fashion.   
There is a related, more conspicuous problem: due to the heterogeneity in people’s tastes, 
some goods are surely downloaded less than some others (consider analyst’s research 
report, maybe only tens out of millions of consumers would want to download it), if we 
do not offer enough sampling points, there will be a bigger error in estimating demand for 
these less popular goods.   
Both issues can be addressed by a practice we call “passive couponing”.  Under 
“passive couponing” regime, only those who downloaded a good will be offered a 
coupon for that good.  After downloading, the consumer learns all the product 
characteristics, so the informative role of couponing as advertising is no longer valid.  
For goods downloaded by the majority of people, we can choose a small fraction out of 
them to offer coupons, and for goods downloaded only by a few, we may offer coupons 
to most or all of them.  In either case, subsequent access to that good, or similar goods, 
can be restricted for consumers who prefer to redeem the coupon instead.  By 
discriminating coupons offered to different types of goods, we can get a better overall 
estimate of the specific demands7. 
                                                
7 What if a good is only downloaded by one consumer? First of all, in this case, this good is not important in the 
bundle, the bundler can exclude it in the future.  Second, the bundler can offer this consumer a different coupon in 
each period with the face value determined by a random draw.  Within some periods of sampling, the bundler can still 
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In previous sections, we did not consider the issue of contract duration.  It is likely to be 
unnecessary to permanently block from access to a good for consumers who redeem the 
corresponding coupon. Temporary blockage will generally suffice.  We can put this 
question into the context of subscription-based business models.  Suppose the bundle is 
to be paid by month (e.g. $20/month), then for time-critical information goods (e.g. news, 
stock quotes, etc.), we can offer the coupons by month, too (e.g. “Take this $1 coupon 
and give up access to CNN news for the next month”).  For those less time-critical 
information goods (e.g. music, software updates, etc), we can offer the coupons by longer 
periods (e.g. “Take this $10 coupon and give up access to music by Madonna for the next 
year”). 
What if the valuations are not independent as assumed in the paper?  If two goods are 
substitutes, offering a coupon for one of them will only help us to estimate the 
incremental value that it brings to the bundle, and this is also true for the other good, so 
we will be paying less for the two creators than the value they bring into the bundle.  
Similarly, for complements, we overestimate total value of the goods.  If we can identify 
clusters of goods that are substitutes or complements to each other, we can offer coupons 
for individual clusters and use the proposed mechanism to estimate the share of 
contribution by each cluster.  This will ensure that a cluster of content providers will be 
paid a fair overall payment.  Within a cluster, each individual content provider can be 
paid according to the estimated share of incremental value they bring to the cluster.   
6 Conclusion 
Major innovations in technologies often engender innovations in business organization. 
The digitization of information is no exception. We seek to advance the debate on how 
best to allocate digital goods and reward their creators by introducing and exploring a 
novel mechanism and analyzing its implications.  
Our approach eliminates the marginal cost of consuming digital information goods for the 
vast majority of consumers via massive bundling. For very large aggregations, this 
preserves most of the static efficiency which could be achieved with a zero price policy. 
                                                                                                                                            
extract the true value, the math works exactly the same as in the proof of proposition 1.  It can also be easily shown 
that there is no incentive for the consumer to mis-report his value in each period. 
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However, in the long run, the more important issue is how to create incentives for 
ongoing innovation. Indeed, our living standards, and those of future generations, depend 
far more on continuing innovation than on simply dividing up the existing set of digital 
goods. In this area, the proposed statistical couponing mechanism shows particular 
promise. We find that our approach can provide substantially better incentives for 
innovation than even the traditional monopoly price system bolstered by artificial 
excludability (e.g. via DRMs, laws, etc.). In particular, the traditional price system, in 
which each good is sold for a specific price with the proceeds going to the monopolist 
creator, focuses virtually on incentives on a very narrow band of consumers - those just 
on the margin of buying. In fact, the price system provides too strong incentives for 
innovations that help this narrow group of consumers. Rents transferred to the creator 
from such innovations exceed the social benefits. In contrast, our approach, using 
statistical sampling and couponing, can provide incentives which are nearly optimal for 
every type of innovation. 
In summary the mechanism we introduce, 
• potentially has orders of magnitude less inefficiency than the traditional price 
system,  
• is budget balancing, requiring no external inflows of money,  
• works with existing technology and existing legal framework,  
• requires no coercion and can be completely voluntary for all parties, since it is fully 
incentive compatible,  
• doesn’t assume that innovators will continue innovate even without financial 
rewards,  
• can be implemented and run in real-time, and  
• is scalable to very large numbers of goods and consumers (in fact, it works better 
for larger numbers),  
Our approach also has weaknesses and challenges. Compared to giving away all digital 
goods for free, our approach will exclude a small number of consumers and create some 
inefficiency as a result. More importantly, our approach does require the creation of new 
business institutions or models, which is never easy. Specifically, an entity is needed to 
manage the statistical sampling and couponing, analyze the resulting data, and allocate 
payments to the content owners accordingly. Near misses for this type of entity already 
exist. For instance, ASCAP does much the same thing already for broadcast music, but 
without accurate price information. Nielsen and similar organizations provide usage 
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information, but again without accurate price information. There are organizations which 
regularly collect and distributed large sums of money to member companies based on 
various algorithms. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which does this for banks 
is one example. Some cooperatives are also run this way. Last but perhaps not least, the 
government regularly makes these types of transactions. However, it should be stressed, 
that our mechanism does not require any government role since all of the participants 
(consumers, content creators, bundlers) have incentives to participate completely 
voluntarily and it adheres to the existing legal framework. This stands in contrasts to the 
proposal by Fisher (2004) or the varied proposals to change copyright or other laws. 
By offering this new framework and analysis, with a new set of opportunities and 
challenges, we hope to lay the foundation for future research on the critical question of 
providing incentives for innovation in the creation of digital content and implementing 
mechanisms to deliver that content to consumers efficiently.  Furthermore, the problems 
that we analyze with existing institutions for providing innovation incentives apply to a 
greater or lesser degree to many other products and services, not just digital goods, and 
variants on the mechanism we describe can also be useful in those other contexts. 
We expect that the next 10 years will likely witness a scale of organizational innovation 
for creating and distributing digital goods surpassing even the remarkable pace of the last 
10 years. New coordination mechanisms, such as the innovation incentive approach 
described and analyzed in this paper will flourish. With a proactive attitude toward 
technology-enabled organizational innovation, we believe that academia can speed this 
process by framing the issues, and by providing tools and analyses. 
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